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INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT/HISTORICAL SETTING:
The concept hit me like a thunaerbolt! I had been mulling over a recent guest speaker's 'literary w characterization of world events based on oceanographic analogies (i.e., mthe tides and currents m of political change), wondering if would-be strategists, like fishermen, should consult their solunar tables before wading into murky political waters.
Other conceptual models for visualizing international politics were available for use in the upcoming strategy paper. For exampl(,, ~arxists and other mhistorical Darwinists subscribe to mnatural selection m and/or mscientific historical law m as the ultimate determinant of international politics. These dogmatic approaches are no handier than the solunar tables, since recent events in Europe do not fit neatly onto a steady
Wevolutionary ladder~ ~ nor do they reflect the meyer-oscillating but always-ascending ~ pattern of dialectical materialism.
Other conceptual devices to render international relations more fathomable include Wbalance of power w (ballast management) approaches; chess analogies/game theories; abnormal psychology and racial stereotyping; and (usually apocalyptic) religious allegories [after having been mmocked and scourged w by a previous Faculty Seminar Leader for dabbling with the ~moralistic m approach, I wasn't anxious to press that particular edge of the academic freedom envelope in my final written requirement].
Thus, my predicament was that I had access to an exceptionally lucid, comprehensive, coherent, and practical framework for analyzing military strategy (pp. 7-9 of syllabus), but there were few reliable, mintellectually gripping t models (telescopes or microscopes) through which to make sense of the discontinuous fits and starts of current events in Europe, nor plot their future trajectories, at least, not using Newtonian mechanics.
That is when mthe apple m from the rafters of Arnold Auditorium hit me on the head, so to speak. Instead of futilely attempting to describe the profound political forces which are reshaping Europe in the obfuscatory jargon of professional?professing political scientists, why not relate the process in simple terms more easily understood by laymen--i.e., by using the basic concepts of nuclear physics and modern cosmology?Then, having established a frame of reference for grappling with the changes which are sweeping Europe, it would be much easier to ~plug and chug w through the algorithm of the UFramework for Military Strategy (Elaborated Version}. m The introductory chapter of the new Principia Strateqica might read as follows:
In many resf~cts, the behavior of states and nations is similar to the behavior of nuclear particles and the aggregations of these particles into successively larger and more complex structures, ranging from atoms to the universe as a whole. Often the mmild interactions t during peacetime of large objects (i~e., NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the US, the Some observers have been so enraptured by this ~macro t cosmic event that important "micro" effects have been slighted during the rush to formulate a ~new" US military strategy.
At the "atomic w level, there are other nuclear forces which are typically exerted only over short (11ocal ~) distances, but whose intensities can be many times those of the nglobal ~ gravitational and electrostatic forces which affect the superpowers" peacetime interactions. The danger of the current wave of tGorbapheliaW is that some US policy-makers will place undue emphasis on today's "instantaneous rate of change ~ while ignoring the underlying power base which drives the process, and ignoring the Soviets' planne d "power curve m which will level off and turn upward over the mid-and long-term.
It is too soon for the US to abandon the basic political tenets embodied in the 1967
WReport on the Future Tasks Response Strategy, adopted at the same time as the Harmel Report, is the military embodiment of the Alliance's continuing, fundamental political objective. At this juncture, continuity rather than radical change is appropriate. The best approach is to examine the mdeltasW, i.e., those tangible factors which have changed--and to make adjustments to US/NATO political and military objectives rather than build a new collective security architecture starting with "brick one. m The empyrean age has not yet dawned in Europe. The Soviet Union is still
• a power to be reckoned with and the explosive instabilities noted above have increased the overall political challenge for the US and its allies.
In an era of (contagious) economic and political turmoil in the Soviet Union and Central
Europe, and at a time when Germany and the Western European states are entering a period of flux, the US has a vital interest in dampening political oscillations and instabilities to manageable levels. In this vital 'steadying" role, a US presence can help in the prevention of politic~l brush fires. The best course of action for the US is to remain an integral player, rather than a bystander, in the process. Furthermore, the best channels for US economic, political, and military integration are "traditional" vehicles such as NATO, although it will also be essential for the US to be a 'player" in emerging fo~a such as the CSCE and to maintain close ties with the EC. It is not in America's best long-term interests to encourage the ascendancy of alternative, "independent European pillars' such as the WEU.
Gorbachev has scaled-back/concealed "the threat' and has temporarily relaxed external pressures on Europe in an effort to reinvigorBte the atrophied economy of the Soviet Union with Western technology and managerial "know how." This will exacerbate US difficulties in pursuing stabilizing international policies during a period of fiscal retrenchment. The residual Soviet threat, though considerable, will be an insufficient bogeyman to 'scare up" support from those segments of the European public which cried out for unilateral disarmament even when the threat was most palpable. The US will, therefore, be more reliant upon its European partners to take the lead in "selling" Allied policies to voters. This will call for a much greater commitment to true consultation with European nations prior to embarking on major policy initiatives. The US must be willing to comply with local 'bylaws' as a responsible tenant in the "new European house." This will entail scrupulous US respect for German sovereignty rights as that nation transitions toward full unification. Ultimately, American policy-makers should seek the closest possible political and economic integration of the US and all European nations to increase the "transparency" of European borders.
Transparent borders and cross-border political/economic equilibria are the best "immunization" against crises stemming from ethnic/national centrifugal and centripetal forces. Border transparency and transnational uniformity Of basic human rights would significantly reduce the pressures to redraw national boundaries (pressures which have sparked many European wars in the past).
MILITARY OBJECTIVES:
The direction and magnitude of recent changes in Europe (i.e., the likely to be limited, and in some respects, more difficult for NATO to deal with. The vulnerable "center of gravity" for NATO will continue to be the political cohesion of the Alliance, whose overall effectiveness is highly dependent on mutual consensus. The center of gravity of a mleaner" and less acquisitive Soviet Union will continue to be its military forces and its coercive security apparatus through which it maintains internal and external control. The Warsaw Pact is now moribund, and whether or not NATO continues to flourish, there is an increased likelihood of bilateral and multilateral (short of NATO-wide or WTO-wide) participation in future crises as the Soviets (and reluctant US allies) attempt to isolate participants and limit the scope of conflicts. Allied unanimity would be especially unlikely in "spill over" conflicts originating in the democratizing nations of Eastern Europe. Developing "backup" bilateral arrangements to hedge against the possibility that NATO fails to act in local (not to mention, out-of-area) conflicts will be a serious challenge for US policy-makers.
MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES:
Strategic surprise may be more difficult for the Soviets to attain opposite NATO's Central Region, depending upon the scenario. Since Soviet intervention could be triggere~ by instability in a neighboring East European state (perhaps by invitation of one faction in a civil war), it is arguable whether NATO could put increasec strategic warning time to effective use. The northern and southern flanks of NATO will remain as vulnerable to tm~nimum warning t scensrios as ever. The assumption that the SovietE might go to war for limited objectives increases NATO's difficulties in reaching a timely consensus on mobilization. Many NATO members woul~ be extremely reticent to take provocative countermeasures in response to a tgraduatedW Soviet intervention in a peripheral conflict near or within its own borders. There is a growing potential for such crises in Central Europe, in the Baltic, and near the Turkish frontier.
Other key trends will be the continuing reduction of NATO and WTO forces within the CFE process and unilateral arms reductions (especially on the part of smaller NATO allies and the new East European regimes). Since fewer ground forces will be positioned near the battlefield during peacetime or during a politically murky Itransition to war j phase, tactical air power will play a more important role as a mobile 11inebacker w to counter enemy force concentrations. Another change is that military operations at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict will be somewhat more likely in Europe--creating challenges for all players in the theater who have tended to focus on general conventional/nuclear war scenarios. Also, the demographic trend of a shrinking 'draft age" cohort in the US and Western Europe (coupled with steadily declining reserve forces} runs opposite to the trend in the Soviet Union where the military manpower pool will continue to grow for the next decade.
This unfavorable mobilization factor will exacerbate the qeoqraphic asymmetries (in favor of the Soviets} which will persist after opposing combat forces are drawn down to rough numerical parity below current NATO levels.
With shrinking military industrial bases in the US and Western Europe, it will be increasingly difficult for most NATO nations to field modern weapon systems capable of performing the full spectrum of modern combat missions. Meanwhile, NATO needs to explore the use of "smart/brilliant" conventional munitions which can cover many high value targets and permit a continuing reduction of sea and land-based ttacticalm nuclear stockpiles.
In order to effectively deter war (a peacetime military objective), deter escalation ('intrawar deterrencel), and compel termination as soon as practical on terms acceptable to the Alliance (wartime objectives), NATO's tactical nuclear arsenal should be modernized to replace ilarge and dirty u warheads with "cleaner', lower yield warheads so as to minimize collateral damage and speed post-war recovery.
In the hope of preventing escalation to massive "countervalue ~ strikes, the use of tactical weapons should restricted, if possible, to "point" or narrowly dispersed "counterforce m targets. Thus, the "nuclear weapon of choice t for military planners and policy-makers in NATO ought to be "enhanced radiation warheads n (neutron bombs). However, this modernization effort can (and should) be very low L key--the psychological target for this move is the adversary government--not the mfriendly" public. NATO strategy and its supporting military capabilities must be discriminately targeted against three m~quares" in the "three by three matrix" of the Clausewitzian trinity (the columns of the matrix are the government, the people, and the army; the rows of the matrix are objectives, means, and will). In wartime, NATO's military forces must be capable of denying attainment of the adversary qovernment's objectives, defeatinq (delaying, disrupting, and destroying) his military means, and undermininq the will of his people. mForward Defense" is still valid as one of the pillars of Flexible Response strategy as enunciated in MC 14/3. However, the implicit partners of forward defense, i.e., 'forward deployment" and "forward training" need to be reexamined in light of new political realities.
First, the location and shape of a future European battlefield will be less certain under the new political conditions on the continent. US and other Allied troops stationed in Germany may, in fact, be garrisoned ~ar from their real-world mgeneral defensive positions~" With,
perhaps, as few as half of the current force levels in Western Europe, it will make little strategic sense to deploy Allied corps shoulder-to-shoulder in a linear defense along the former inter-German border.
Instead, NATO combat forces should be dispersed in greater 9 defensive depth~ relying on greater mobility to deploy to critical points in the 'theater strategic operation, n Tactical air power (both land-and carrier-based} will play a more crucial role as mgap fillers" due to the reduced density of forces. The increasing disparity in capabilities among Allied national corps (and their supporting air forces) also militates against the current "linear" defensive plan. Also, as mentioned earlier, a graduated escalation scenario leading to localized, limited war, would likely result in various Allies staggering their national mobilization decisions. These nations (based on past experience, Belgium and the Netherlands might fall in this category) should be included in strategic plans as late-closing "reserve m forces which would initially take up positions well to the rear of the major, "front-line" nations in the Alliance.
As conventional force negotiations and free-falling fiscal support vie to establish ~basal" force levels, the US will have to place greater reliance on dual-based air and ground forces to meet wartime commitments, with fewer forces permanently stationed in theater over the mid-term. Over the long-term, it is conceivable that only forward logistic elements (and prepositioned materiel) would remain in theater, and that combat ground units and TACAIR squadrons would rotate into the country. The timing of this 'rote w pattern for US forces should enable a full cross-section of mission capabilities to be available in the theater at any given time (e.g., in the case of tactical air forces, these mission areas would include counter air, surface attack~ electronic combat, air lift, reconnaissance, and command and control}. Training and exercise operations will tend to be smaller and more "transparent n in the wake of CSBM accords impacting all 35 CSCE nations. More training of US forces will have to take place in the US, with local area familiarization occurring during rotations to Europe. It goes without saying that US forces will have to comply with the same training and exercise restrictions which host nations place on their own forces. The traditional argument that NATO-assigned forces need to train in peacetime over the same territory they would defend in wartime will become less compelling as it becomes increasing difficult to predict exactly where in the theater these forces will be applied in wartime. The assumption that the Soviets'would attack with minimum warning across the breadth of Europe, with the goal of I0 seizing the entire continent, will be untenable--maklng NATO strategic plannlng more difficult due to the greater uncertainties of the scenario.
The highly integrated, Woperational level t concepts of Follow-on Forces Attack and Deep
Battle will still be applicable to military operations near the FEBA, in the enemy's rear areas, and in NATO's mcommunication zone. m Lower force densities at the ~utset of hostilities will make these forms of Idefense in depth w even more important as Allied forces are stretched thin while carrying out their objectives of delaying, disrupting, and destroying enemy forces while deterring escalation to weapons of mass destruction. With the conditions of battle being less predictable, Allied weapon systems will have to be more flexible.
A higher premium will be placed on ~multirole t air and ground systems.
Specialized platforms which can only perform a single role in one phase of a campaign will much less attractive in a numerically constrained environment.
As noted in an earlier section, if the IBalkanization m of Europe continues to spread from NATO's eastern borders to the Urals, the chances of the US being drawn into a major European conflagration (a'la World Wars I and II) will increase. The triggering mechanism for another such explosion is already in place. A highly visible, mconvincing ~ US presence and the concerted efforts of our allies in NATO and the EC may also help to keep the mlid on m as Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union attempt to pull themselves up by their bootstraps.
But alliances which depend upon unanimous consent before taking action can be paralyzed by one or two dissenting votes. Therefore, the US needs to back up its NATO plans with complementary bilateral agreements with as many European nations as possible. For scenarios in which only a subset of HATO nations play, it may be necessary for the US to supply the critical C~I nodes necessary to execute operations. Future conflicts may begin as insurgencies or as civil wars rather than massive, simultaneous conventional and/or nuclear assaults launched on ~D-Day ~. In order to control escalation in such conflicts, the US may need to conduct low intensity operations in Europe, using (~typical} diplomatic finesse during parallel negotiations with opposing factions, and using the utmost care in establishing rules of engagement.
The new realities in Eastern Europe will make it more difficult for NATO to ignore out-of-area conflicts, since the demarcation llne between "AOR and OOA' has become much more difficult to define. Out-of-area operations and mlimited conflicts w will likely be the domain of US unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral efforts involving small "ensembles m of NATO members, rather than the entire Alliance in concert.
A final strategic recommendation is that the US reexamine the Wwiring diagram t of NATO's integrated military structure and institute long-overdue changes which will establish ~ more equitable basis for partnership in an alliance of sovereign nations. NATO's political/milltary objectives and its fielded capabilities. NATO lacked the political will to commit sufficient resources to achieve conventional deterrence after the "Lisbon Conference" in 1952.
The US "trip wire/massive retaliation" strategy was backed by credible nuclear forces, but its political objectives were incredible. NATO's MC 14/3 Flexible Response strategy suffered from a similar capabilities-objectives mismatch after the Soviets attained "escalation dominance" at every rung of the ladder of conflict. Ironically,
Gorbachev's own actions may help to create conditions in which Flexible Response will be more credible.
In the emerging European environment, it may be more likely that conflicts can be limited, contained, and terminated short of an apocalyptic, strategic nuclear exchange.
Soviet force reductions and {perhaps) doctrinal changes can increase stability and bolster Flexible Response by reducing the capabilities gap between Soviet and NATO forces.
Hopefully, the strategy and force adjustments suggested above would further increase stability and improve the odds for the attainment of democratic aspirations throughout a new, 'European house." The "down-side' of the suggested adjustments is that the proposed "instantaneous rate of change" of force structure will not satisfy policy-makers who have fixated on immediate, windfall savings (with which to retire portions of the deficit or finance other socioeconomic projects/experiments).
The Heisenberg "Uncertainty Principle" (which laid the foundation for quantum mechanics, with help from Planck, Schrodinger, Einstein, and others) is based on the premise that it is impossible to know precisely or simultaneously the current position and velocity vector of an electron. If it is difficult for "rocket scientists" to approximate the current state and future trends of a single elementary particle, it is probably twice as difficult for a lowly War College student to confidently predict where hundreds of millions of Americans and 'Eurasians" will find themselves ten years from now. One can only hope that "cooler heads'
will prevail and that US military planners will be allowed to follow a deliberate course toward a more stable, more secure, and safer strategic posture in Europe.
